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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent progressive pro-arbitration campaign has 
transformed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) into a powerful tool for big 
businesses to try and limit their prospective liability and reduce consumers’ 
options in bringing claims against them.1  At the same time, since the 
creation of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in 2007 
and the increased power over the securities industry given to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), broker-dealers in the securities industry 
have become more and more closely regulated.2  Thus, it was only a matter 
of time before these competing policies collided. 
The first domino fell with the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion3 to uphold a class action waiver in an 
arbitration agreement against state law that found the provision 
unconscionable.4  In the aftermath of Concepcion, Charles Schwab & Co., a 
brokerage firm in the securities industry, made an attempt to shield itself 
from having to defend against an accumulation of small dollar claims by 
amending its agreement with customers to include a provision that 
prohibited class actions and the joinder of claims—requiring that all disputes 
be individually arbitrated.5  However, FINRA, exercising its regulatory 
 
 1. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal Arbitration Act, 1 
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 2 (2012).  
 2. Thomas J. Greene, Finding Fairness in Arbitration: A Discussion About Whether Securities 
Class Action Waivers Should Be Prohibited, 20 No. 2 PIABA B.J. 207, 207 (2013); see also infra 
Part II.A. 
 3. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 4. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 5. Greene, supra note 2, at 208; see Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Inc., 
861 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  The entire text of the provision included: 
Waiver of Class Action or Representative Action.  Neither you nor Schwab shall be 
entitled to arbitrate any claims as a class action or representative action, and the 
arbitrator(s) shall have no authority to consolidate more than one parties’ claims or to 
proceed on a representative or class basis.  You and Schwab agree that any actions 
between us and /or [sic] Related Third Parties shall be brought solely in our individual 
capacities.  You and Schwab hereby waive any right to bring a class action, or any type 
of representative action against each other or any Related Third Parties in court.  You and 
Schwab waive any right to participate as a class member, or in any other capacity, in any 
class action or representative action brought by any other person, entity or agency against 
Schwab or you. 
Id.  In explaining why it changed its customer agreement, Schwab stated that it “acted to protect its 
shareholders and customers from the high costs and inefficiencies associated with customer class 
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authority in pursuit of investor protection,6 brought a disciplinary action 
against Schwab on February 1, 2012, seeking sanctions because it believed 
Schwab’s arbitration agreement violated FINRA’s rules applicable to all of 
its broker-dealer members.7  Therefore, a concrete conflict, which the 
Supreme Court has yet to directly address, arose over whether the FAA’s 
mandate to enforce arbitration agreements according to its terms8 is powerful 
enough to defeat rules promulgated—in pursuit of providing increased 
investor protection—by FINRA, a self-regulatory organization overseen by 
the SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9 
This debate sparked substantial publicity.10  Most obviously, if Schwab 
would have succeeded and was able to enforce its class action waiver, many 
other broker-dealers in the securities industry would likely have followed 
suit.11  Moreover, the ultimate decision, especially if the case would have 
made it to a federal circuit court or the Supreme Court,12 would have likely 
provided an answer to the broader question that all self-regulatory 
organizations and government agencies are asking: “Does the FAA limit the 
ability of federal regulators acting pursuant to congressional authority to 
impose conditions and limitations on the use of arbitration provisions in 
order to ensure fairness?”13 
 
actions.”  Complaint for Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief ¶ 25, Charles 
Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (No. CV 12 0518). 
 6. About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).   
 7. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. 
 8. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.  
 13. Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 10.  However, instead of the case making its way to a federal 
circuit court where the decision would become guidance and precedent governing at least a portion 
of the country, on April 24, 2014, the parties settled.  Charles Schwab Fined $500,000 by FINRA 
Over Class Action Waiver, IMPACT LITIG. J. (May 12, 2014), 
http://www.impactlitigation.com/2014/05/12/charles-schwab-fined-500000-by-finra-over-class-actio 
n-waiver/.  Schwab agreed to pay $500,000 in fines and acknowledged that its inclusion of a class 
action waiver in its customer agreement was a violation of FINRA Rules, pursuant to a ruling by the 
FINRA Board of Governors.  Id.; see also Decision, Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co. 
(Complaint No. 2011029760201) (FINRA Board of Governors Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter FINRA 
Board of Governors Decision], available at http://www.impactlitigation.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/Schwab-FINRA-Board-Decision.pdf.  Thus, although this specific dispute 
has been resolved anticlimactically, the broader question of how the FAA should be interpreted 
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This Comment answers that question in the affirmative and argues that 
recent Supreme Court precedent,14 circuit court decisions in contexts similar 
to FINRA’s oversight of the securities industry,15 and investors’ true 
interests16 all instruct that Schwab’s class action waiver should have been 
enforced over FINRA’s contrary command.17  Part II discusses FINRA’s 
role in the securities industry, the FAA and recent Supreme Court precedent 
interpreting the FAA, and the FINRA Rules that Schwab’s class action and 
joinder waiver violated.18  Part III analyzes why the conflict between the 
FAA and FINRA’s rules should have been resolved in favor of the FAA19 
and supports this argument with discussion of federal circuit court decisions 
in contexts analogous to the securities industry.20  Part IV addresses the fears 
voiced by investor protection advocates and articulates the policy reasons in 
support of enforcing the class action waiver, arguing that its enforcement 
would have actually benefited investors.21  Part V concludes.22 
II. BACKGROUND: THE ORIGIN OF FINRA AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE FAA 
A. FINRA’s Role in the Securities Industry 
Congress has recognized, as part of the “national public interest,” the 
need to “provide for regulation and control of [securities] transactions” and 
related matters by adopting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its 
subsequent amendments.23  Through this enactment, Congress asserted its 
 
when its rules contradict regulations promulgated by unelected federal regulators still remains.     
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part III.B−C. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra Part III.A. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. See infra Part III.B−C. 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. See infra Part V. 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).  One of the main factors prompting “enactment of the Federal 
securities acts was recognition of the intricate nature and high liquidity of securities and of the 
corresponding duties necessarily assumed by those who deal in them.”  SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL 
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SEC, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 1, at VI (1963).  The 
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reliance, to a large extent, “on industry self-regulation and designated 
national securities exchanges as [self-regulatory organizations (SROs),] 
because they were already in existence” and regulating their members.24  
Congress amended the Exchange Act in 1938, authorizing “the registration 
of national securities associations to regulate brokers in the over-the-counter 
market.”25  The National Association of Securities Dealers26 (NASD) was 
incorporated in 1936 and then, in 2007, “merged with the regulation and 
enforcement functions of the New York Stock Exchange [(NYSE)].”27  The 
resulting entity was renamed the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or 
FINRA.28 
FINRA functions “as a self-regulatory organization . . . registered with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . as a national securities 
association.”29  FINRA’s main duty “is to carry out the statutory purposes 
and to enforce compliance by its members and associated persons with the 
provisions of the Exchange Act and its regulations as well as FINRA’s own 
rules.”30  FINRA is required by the Exchange Act to promulgate rules for a 
variety of purposes, but in general, it must work to protect both the public 
 
securities industry, specifically broker-dealers, “is highly regulated ‘because of its economic 
importance’ and ‘the possibility of investor abuse.’”  Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 17 (quoting 
NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 1.01 (4th ed. 
2007)).  
 24. Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 16 n.98. 
 25. Id.; see, e.g., Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“As an integral part of a comprehensive system of federal regulation of the securities industry, the 
NASD regulates the over-the-counter securities market, which includes securities firms and 
registered representatives who buy and sell over-the-counter-securities.”). 
 26. The NASD was a SRO of the securities industry in charge of the “operation and regulation of 
the Nasdaq stock market and over-the-counter markets.”  Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers—NASD, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nasd.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).  
 27. Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1065 
(N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 28. Id.  “FINRA, as NASD’s successor, is the only officially registered national securities 
association under [the Exchange Act].”  Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In fact, FINRA “is the largest 
independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.”  Black & Gross, 
supra note 1, at 17. 
 29. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1065.  FINRA is not a government agency; rather, 
it is “a private, not-for-profit Delaware corporation.”  Id.   
 30. Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 17−18; see 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2012).  
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interest and investors.31 
Congress passed another amendment to the Exchange Act in 1975 that 
gave broad new powers over SROs in the securities industry to the SEC.32  
Among these powers was the ability to review all of the SROs’ proposed 
rules after they have been published for public comment33 “and to require 
[SROs] to adopt, change or repeal any rules.”34  Additionally, the SEC’s 
oversight of FINRA includes FINRA’s arbitration forum, which is the 
largest dispute resolution tribunal in the securities industry.35  The SEC, 
since the 1970s, has found it essential to have a “nationwide investor dispute 
resolution system to handle small claims” and has worked alongside FINRA, 
industry members, and “investor groups to develop arbitration rules to 
achieve this result.”36  FINRA’s rules now have substantial power because 
the Exchange Act voids any agreement or contract that forces a party to 
waive compliance with FINRA Rules.37  Most important for this Comment, 
the SEC also has “explicit authority to prohibit, or to impose conditions or 
limitations on the use of”38 agreements by broker-dealers that require 
investors to arbitrate future disputes, as long as the action is taken in pursuit 
of “the public interest and [is] for the protection of investors.”39  FINRA has 
 
 31. Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 18. 
 32. Id. at 16 n.98; see POSER & FANTO, supra note 23, at § 1.01. 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2012); Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1065.  
 34. Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 16 n.98; see 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2012).  However, FINRA 
“members can petition the SEC for changes to FINRA’s rules.”  Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1065.    
 35. Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 17; Arbitration & Mediation, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/index.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).  
 36. Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 18 (citing Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by 
NYSE, NASD, and ASE Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration 
Clauses, 54 Fed. Reg. 21144-03 (May 16, 1989)).  The SEC has consistently focused on fairness and 
has required not only that investors properly understand the FINRA arbitration process, but also that 
investors maintain similar rights and remedies they otherwise would have in court.  Id. at 19. 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to 
waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of 
any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.” (emphasis added)). 
 38. Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 23. 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o) (2012) (“The Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or impose conditions or 
limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or 
municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the Federal 
securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if 
it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public interest and for 
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enormous power over broker-dealer members because it is the only regulator 
in the securities industry, is backed by the SEC, and has the ability to 
independently “sanction members for noncompliance with securities laws 
and FINRA Rules”—it can even impose “fines, censure, and suspension or 
revocation of membership or registration.”40 
In its regulation of broker-dealers, FINRA disciplines members in a 
five-stage process.41  The first step is for a FINRA Hearing Panel to hear 
FINRA’s Department of Enforcement’s complaint.42  Then, either party can 
appeal the Hearing Panel’s decision to the FINRA National Adjudicatory 
Council (NAC).43  Next, the NAC’s decision can be reviewed by the FINRA 
Board of Governors sua sponte,44 or an aggrieved broker-dealer can ask for 
 
the protection of investors.”).  Thus, under § 78o(o), the SEC can ban broker-dealers from using pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in the federal securities industry as long as it can show that it was 
done in order to protect investors and was in the public interest.  Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 23.  
This authority obviously encompasses class action waivers, and some scholars argue that the SEC 
may do so even “if [it] conflicts with the polices and purposes of the FAA.”  Id. at 24. 
 40. Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1065 
(N.D. Cal. 2012); see also FINRA R. 8310.  Due to the SEC’s oversight, FINRA’s SEC-approved 
rules “are expressions of federal legislative power and have the force and effect of a federal 
regulation.”  Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1065; see also Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. 
v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1132 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In sum, we conclude that SRO rules that have 
been approved by the Commission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) preempt state law when the two 
are in conflict, either directly or because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
the objectives of Congress.  Specifically, we hold that the NASD arbitration procedures in dispute 
here have preemptive force over conflicting state law.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); supra 
notes 23−39 and accompanying text. 
 41. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.  FINRA exerts substantial effort to 
“employ[] a fair system for disciplining firms and individuals who break the rules.”  Adjudication, 
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/Adjudication/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).   
 42. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1066; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h)(1) (2012); 
FINRA R. 9231(b).  The Hearing Panel “is chaired by a professional hearing officer and includes 
two industry representatives.”  Adjudication, supra note 41.  In making its decision as to whether a 
violation has occurred, the Hearing Panel “considers previous court, SEC, and FINRA’s National 
Adjudicatory Council (NAC) decisions.”  Id.  To determine the appropriate sanctions, the Hearing 
Panel “uses the FINRA Sanction Guidelines.”  Id.  Finally, the Hearing Panel releases a written 
decision where it explains its reasoning.  Id.   
 43. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1066; see also FINRA R. 9311(a)–(b).  The NAC 
is composed of an equal balance of “individuals who are in the securities business and nonindustry 
representatives.”  Adjudication, supra note 41.  FINRA cannot appeal the NAC’s decision unless 
“FINRA’s Board of Governors decides to review the . . . decision.”  Id. 
 44. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1066; see also FINRA R. 9351. 
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the decision to be reviewed by the SEC.45  Finally, the process culminates by 
allowing a broker-dealer to “appeal an adverse determination by the SEC to 
a federal circuit court of appeals.”46  Thus, although this process can take 
quite some time to complete,47 it provides sufficient review to protect 
members from disciplinary decisions that are unfounded or result in 
excessive punishment.48 
FINRA is aggressively vigilant in disciplining registered brokers and 
firms, levying fines, and referring fraud and insider trading cases to the SEC 
for prosecution.49  Overall, FINRA enforces its rules against, and governs the 
activities of, over “4,135 securities firms with approximately 634,505 
brokers.”50  However, despite FINRA’s power as the lone self-regulatory 
organization of the securities industry, its rules and discipline must still 
abide by other congressional legislation like the FAA and Supreme Court 
precedent.51 
B. The Federal Arbitration Act as Interpreted by the Supreme Court 
1. The Federal Arbitration Act 
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 as a “response to widespread judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements.”52  The FAA seeks to compensate for this 
hostility by “plac[ing] arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other 
 
 45. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1066; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (2012); FINRA 
R. 9370(a). 
 46. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1066; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (2012). 
 47. See, e.g., PAZ Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 494 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (exemplifying a disciplinary 
complaint that lasted from August 14, 2003, until the appellate court ruling on July 20, 2007). 
 48. See supra notes 42−47 and accompanying text. 
 49. About FINRA, supra note 6.  In 2013 alone, FINRA instituted 1,535 disciplinary actions 
against broker-dealers, fined broker-dealers and their associated persons over $65 million, “ordered 
more than $9.5 million in restitution to harmed investors,” and “referred 660 fraud and insider 
trading cases” for prosecution or litigation to the SEC and other enforcement agencies.  Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See infra Part III.A. 
 52. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); see also Hall St. Assocs., 
LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (“Congress enacted the FAA to replace judicial 
indisposition to arbitration with a ‘national policy favoring [it] and plac[ing] arbitration agreements 
on equal footing with all other contracts.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, 
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006))). 
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contracts.”53  “[T]he primary substantive provision of the Act,”54 § 2, states: 
 A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, 
or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.55 
Thus, the FAA, and specifically § 2, establishes “a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements.”56  The Supreme Court has continually 
stated that the FAA “create[s] a body of federal substantive law of 
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of 
the Act.”57  However, the Supreme Court’s more recent jurisprudence has 
elevated the FAA’s status whereby it now “governs virtually every 
arbitration clause arising out of a commercial transaction.”58  In addition, the 
 
 53. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225−26 (1987) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 54. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 55. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  This provision reflects the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a 
matter of contract.”  Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).  The last phrase of 
§ 2, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” has 
been deemed the “saving clause” and “permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that 
apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at 
issue.”  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 
687 (1996)).  In addition, the FAA “provides that a court must stay its proceedings if it is satisfied 
that an issue before it is arbitrable under the agreement.”  McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (citing 
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982)).  The Act also “authorizes a federal district court to issue an order compelling 
arbitration if there has been a ‘failure, neglect, or refusal’ to comply with the arbitration agreement.”  
Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982)).   
 56. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. at 24; see also CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. 
Ct. 665, 669 (2012); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226. 
 57. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. at 24.  The Mercury Construction Corp. Court stated that 
the FAA creates “the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.”  Id. at 25 n.32. 
 58. Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 12.  As seen above, § 2 of the FAA states that it governs 
arbitration agreements within “transaction[s] involving commerce” which the Court has broadly 
interpreted to mean any transaction that “affect[s]” commerce.  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
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Court has found that the FAA applies in both state and federal court,59 
“compels the arbitrability of federal statutory claims,”60 allows the arbitrator 
to decide if an arbitration clause is unconscionable,61 and preempts any state 
law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”62  Thus, the FAA is a powerful 
act with widespread effects. 
2. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
Concepcion is an extremely important case in this analysis because its 
holding prompted Schwab to change its contract with investors and is the 
first of many recent high-profile FAA-related Supreme Court decisions.63  
Concepcion involved a contract between AT&T Mobility LLC (AT&T) and 
Vincent and Liza Concepcion, which “provided for arbitration of all disputes 
between the parties, but required that claims be brought in the parties’ 
individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported 
class or representative proceeding.”64  A dispute arose when the 
 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273−74 (1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)); see also 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (applying the FAA to securities 
transactions).  
 59. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (finding that previous statements by 
the Court made the FAA “an exercise of the Commerce Clause power[, which] clearly implied that 
the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts”).  
 60. Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 12 (citing CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. 665). 
 61. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2010). 
 62. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).   
 63. Complaint for Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, supra note 5, at 
¶ 25; see also Bill Singer, FINRA Decision on Charles Schwab Arbitration Agreement, 
BROKEANDBROKER.COM (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.brokeandbroker.com/1886/decision-charles-
schwab-arbitration-agreement/; E. Sebastian Arduengo, FINRA/Schwab Arbitration Decision: 
Taking the Cash in Hand and Waiving the Rest, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://americanconstitutionsociety.org/acsblog/finraschwab-arbitration-decision-taking-the-cash-in-
hand-and-waiving-the-rest.  Concepcion was decided April 27, 2011, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 
1740, and then Schwab amended its customer agreement just a few months later in October of 2011.  
Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 
2012); see infra note 116 and accompanying text.   
 64. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This contract provision 
stated “the arbitrator may not consolidate more than one person’s claims, and may not otherwise 
preside over any form of a representative or class proceeding.”  Id. at 1744 n.2.  The agreement also 
allowed AT&T to make unilateral amendments to the arbitration provision, which it did numerous 
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Concepcions purchased AT&T service in response to an advertisement 
where purchasing service came with free phones.65  The Concepcions 
received their free phones, but “were charged $30.22 in sales tax based on 
the phones’ retail value.”66  So, the Concepcions filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of California, and their 
complaint was consolidated with a putative class action against AT&T 
alleging “false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it 
advertised as free.”67 
In March 2008, AT&T tried to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms 
of the contract.68  The district court evaluated the clause in light of California 
law, specifically California Supreme Court precedent from the Discover 
Bank case.69  The Discover Bank decision relied on California’s 
unconscionability law70 to invalidate a class-action waiver in an arbitration 
agreement.  The California Supreme Court held that: 
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a 
setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably 
involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the 
party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme 
to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the 
exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or 
 
times.  Id. at 1744.  One of the amendments made in December 2006, and that was controlling in the 
dispute, included several parts favorable to customers.  Id.  The amendment allowed AT&T to offer 
to settle the claim; required AT&T to pay all arbitration “costs for nonfrivolous claims;” required 
that the arbitration “take place in the county in which the customer is billed;” prevented AT&T from 
seeking reimbursement for its attorney fees; and, “in the event that a customer receives an arbitration 
award greater than [AT&T’s] last written settlement offer, require[d] [AT&T] to pay a $7,500 
minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees.”  Id.  In 2009, AT&T 
increased this guaranteed minimum recovery to $10,000.  Id. at 1744 n.3.     
 65. Id. at 1744. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1744–45. 
 69. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740. 
 70. “[C]ourts may refuse to enforce any contract found ‘to have been unconscionable at the time 
it was made,’ or may ‘limit the application of any unconscionable clause.’”  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1746 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985)). 
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willful injury to the person or property of another.’  Under these 
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California 
law and should not be enforced.71 
Despite describing AT&T’s arbitration clause favorably,72 the district 
court denied the motion based on Discover Bank and found AT&T’s 
arbitration provision unconscionable because AT&T could “not show[] that 
bilateral arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class 
actions” and the efficient resolution of third-party claims.73 
After the district court refused to compel arbitration, AT&T appealed.74  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding “that the Discover Bank rule was not 
preempted by the FAA because that rule was simply ‘a refinement of the 
unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California.’”75  
AT&T sought review from the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted.76 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding that 
the FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank rule because it “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”77  Despite the Discover Bank rule’s applicability to 
all class action waivers in dispute resolution contracts,78 the Court found that 
 
 71. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1668 (West 1985)). 
 72. The district court noted that the arbitration process “was ‘quick, easy to use’ and likely to 
‘promp[t] full or . . . even excess payment to the customer without the need to arbitrate or litigate’” 
and that “consumers who were members of a class would likely be worse off.”  Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1745 (alteration in original) (quoting Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS 
(AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom, Laster v. AT & T 
Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740). 
 73. Id. (citing Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14).  
 74. Laster, 584 F.3d 849, 851. 
 75. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (quoting Laster, 584 F.3d at 857). 
 76. AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 560 U.S. 923 (2010). 
 77. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  The 
Court stated that, despite the dissent’s contrary argument, “[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA . . . 
is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings.  Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”  Id. at 
1748 (emphasis added).  Contrary to the majority stating that a purpose of the FAA was procedural 
expediency, the dissent referenced the Court in Dean Witter that “reject[ed] the suggestion that the 
overriding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims.”  Id. at 1758 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).   
 78. Justice Breyer argued in dissent (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) that 
the generally applicable nature of the Discover Bank rule allowed class action waivers to fall within 
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the rule did not fall within the FAA’s saving clause.79  The majority reasoned 
that although the Discover Bank rule did not require classwide arbitration, 
consumers could demand it after the fact, which went against the FAA’s 
purposes.80  The majority further found that class arbitration, as compared to 
bilateral arbitration, was inconsistent with the FAA because it sacrificed 
arbitration’s “principal advantage” of informality in three ways: (1) by 
making the process slower and more costly; (2) by increasing formality 
because absent class members would have to be dealt with properly to make 
the decision binding on them; and (3) by increasing risks to defendants 
because judicial review would be more difficult, causing “defendants [to] be 
pressured into settling questionable claims.”81  So, despite the dissent’s 
argument that enforcing class arbitration waivers on consumers would 
deprive them of their claims,82 the Court held that “States cannot require a 
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for 
unrelated reasons.”83 
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, maintained that the Discover Bank rule 
was consistent with the FAA and fell within the FAA’s saving clause 
because it “applie[d] equally to class action litigation waivers in contracts 
without arbitration agreements” as to those with arbitration agreements.84  
 
the FAA’s saving clause, thus making it consistent with the FAA.  Id. at 1757. 
 79. Id. at 1748 (majority opinion); see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (stating that the saving clause 
refers to the language from § 2 of the FAA, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract”); supra note 55 and accompanying text.  Justice Scalia noted that 
although the “saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests 
an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand” in the way of achieving the FAA’s objectives.  
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.  As additional support, the Court found it “worth noting that 
California’s courts have been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable than other 
contracts.”  Id. at 1747.  
 80. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51. 
 81. Id. at 1750−52.  Justice Scalia also highlighted that class procedures make confidentiality 
more difficult and that finding an arbitrator familiar with class-certification procedures is similarly 
onerous.  Id. at 1750.   
 82. Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 1753 (majority opinion).  Justice Thomas concurred, but wrote separately because he 
found a limit in the FAA’s saving clause on permissible contract defenses.  Id. (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  Under his reading, “the FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless 
a party successfully challenges the formation of the arbitration agreement, such as by proving fraud 
or duress.”  Id.  Therefore, he argued that the Discover Bank rule was inconsistent with the FAA 
because it “d[id] not relate to defects in the making of an agreement.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
 84. Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 
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Justice Breyer further supported his argument by highlighting how “class 
proceedings [were] necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might 
otherwise slip through the legal system.”85  He contended that enforcing 
class arbitration waivers would “have the effect of depriving claimants of 
their claims,” so state courts should have the ability to protect investors and 
prevent an agreement’s author from “insulat[ing itself] from liability for its 
own frauds by ‘deliberately cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money.’”86  Conveniently, the Court did not wait 
long before providing further clarification of how conflicts between 
arbitration agreements and class action plaintiffs are to be resolved. 
3. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
Despite many cries of support for Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Concepcion, two years later in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant, the Court strongly stated that enforcement of the FAA and 
arbitration agreements according to their terms would endure even in the 
face of claims that will go unrecompensed without a class action 
alternative.87  In Italian Colors Restaurant, the restaurant alleged that 
“American Express used its monopoly power in the market for charge cards 
to force merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately 30% higher 
than the fees for competing credit cards,” thus violating § 1 of the Sherman 
Act.88  The parties’ contract “require[d] all disputes between [them] to be 
resolved by arbitration” and also included a class action waiver, so 
American Express moved to compel arbitration under the FAA.89  Italian 
 
1112 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740).   
 85. Id. at 1753 (majority opinion).  Justice Breyer questioned the majority, “What rational lawyer 
would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming 
from a $30.22 claim?”  Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 
376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million 
individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”)). 
 86. Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting Discover Bank, 
113 P.3d at 1110).  However, this second argument about making sure that consumers are able to 
recover on small-value claims was foreclosed by the Court’s subsequent ruling in American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.  See 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); see also infra Part II.B.3. 
 87. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2312.  
 88. Id. at 2308. 
 89. Id.  
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Colors Restaurant resisted this compulsion, arguing that “the cost of an 
expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims . . . might exceed $1 
million, while the maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff would be 
$12,850 [to] $38,549.”90  After a busy lower court history,91 the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine “[w]hether the [FAA] permits 
courts . . . to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not 
permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.”92 
In a majority opinion, the Court found that the class action waiver was 
enforceable because “[n]o contrary congressional command require[d]” the 
Court to reject it.93  Regarding Italian Colors Restaurant’s “effective 
vindication” argument,94 the Court found that “the fact that it is not worth the 
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the 
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”95  In fact, Justice Scalia felt 
that the Court’s “decision in [Concepcion] all but resolve[d] this case” 
because that decision “rejected the argument that class arbitration was 
necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the legal 
system.’”96  Thus, it is well settled that the Supreme Court has no sympathy 
 
 90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Id.  The district court granted the motion to compel, but the court of appeals reversed, after 
which the Supreme Court “granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further 
consideration in light of Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662[ (2010)].”  Id.  
The Second Circuit “stood by its reversal,” but “then sua sponte reconsidered its ruling in light of” 
Concepcion, but again maintained its decision,  and even “denied rehearing en banc.”  Id.   
 92.  Id. (first and third alterations in original). 
 93. Id. at 2309.  The Court found that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable 
procedural path to the vindication of every claim” nor do they “‘evinc[e] an intention to preclude a 
waiver’ of class-action procedure.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).  
 94. The effective vindication exception is a “judge-made exception to the FAA” where the Court 
in Mitsubishi Motors, in dictum, “expressed a willingness to invalidate, on ‘public policy’ grounds, 
arbitration agreements that ‘operat[e] . . . as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies.’”  Id. at 2310 (alterations in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 
637 n.19).  Thus, Italian Colors Restaurant’s argument was that enforcing the class action waiver 
against them prevented them from effectively vindicating their rights because the high costs of 
experts would leave them with “no economic incentive to pursue their antitrust claims individually 
in arbitration.”  Id.    
 95. Id. at 2310–11 (arguing that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and 
deterrent function” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637)). 
 96. Id. at 2312 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)).  
Justice Thomas concurred in the opinion because the result was “required by the plain meaning of 
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for, and gives no weight to, the argument that class action waivers should 
not be enforceable when they prevent a party from seeking redress because it 
is economically unwise.97 
4. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood 
Concepcion made it clear that the FAA overrides conflicting state law,98 
and Italian Colors Restaurant demonstrated that the lack of an economic 
incentive to pursue a claim when no class action alternative exists does not 
prevent the application of the FAA either.99  But, is the FAA so powerful 
that it trumps contrary federal agency-approved rules?  The Court provided 
additional clues in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood.100 
In CompuCredit Corp., the Court held that even with regard to federal 
statutory claims, unless the statute explicitly requires resolution in court by 
class action, the parties’ arbitration agreement is still enforceable pursuant to 
the FAA.101  Plaintiffs were consumers who received a credit card marketed 
by CompuCredit and issued by Columbus Bank and Trust that had been 
advertised to consumers with poor credit as a way to rebuild their bad credit 
and boost their credit ratings.102  These customers were told they would 
receive a $300 credit limit, but the limit was greatly reduced when they were 
immediately assessed multiple fees, making it very difficult for them to 
 
the [FAA]” because Italian Colors Restaurant did not challenge the formation of the contract.  Id. 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Kagan dissented because she found that the “effective vindication” 
exception applied, because applying the rule in this context “would ensure that Amex’s arbitration 
clause does not foreclose Italian Colors from vindicating its right to redress antitrust harm.”  Id. at 
2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Justice Kagan found that it was not just the class action waiver that 
prevented Italian Colors Restaurant from gaining redress, but it was the class action waiver in 
addition to the disallowance of “joinder or consolidation of claims or parties,” the prevention of 
Italian Colors Restaurant from working “with other merchants to produce a common expert report,” 
the preclusion of “any shifting of costs to Amex,” and Amex’s refusal “to enter into any stipulations 
that would obviate or mitigate the need for the economic analysis.”  Id. at 2316.  She found that the 
agreement “cut[] off not just class arbitration, but any avenue for sharing, shifting, or shrinking 
necessary costs,” thus preventing vindication of Italian Colors Restaurant’s rights.  Id.   
 97. See supra notes 86−96 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740; see also supra Part II.B.2.   
 99. See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304; see also supra Part II.B.3. 
 100. 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
 101. Id. at 673. 
 102. Id. at 668 (majority opinion), 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
[Vol. 42: 109, 2014] The Great and Powerful FAA 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
125 
improve their credit ratings.103  The consumers alleged violations of the 
Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA),104 which provides that consumers 
have the “right to sue [the] credit repair organization,”105 but the parties’ 
contract contained a provision requiring all disputes to be resolved by 
binding arbitration.106  The consumers filed a class action in federal court, 
and the district court refused to compel arbitration.107  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, finding that the CROA’s “right to sue” language required the right 
to sue in a court of law.108  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether the CROA precluded enforcing an “arbitration agreement in a 
lawsuit alleging violations of that Act.”109 
The Court stated that the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration 
agreements unless its mandate “has been ‘overridden by a contrary 
congressional command.’”110  Because the Court did not find a contrary 
congressional command, and because arbitration satisfied the “statutory 
prescription of civil liability in court,” the Court deemed the arbitration 
agreement enforceable.111  As additional support, the Court noted that if 
Congress truly wanted to preserve consumers’ right to sue in judicial court, 
it would have said so more explicitly.112  Thus, CompuCredit Corp. clearly 
stands for the proposition that the FAA mandates the arbitration of federal 
statutory claims that lack express language disfavoring arbitration.113  
 
 103. Id. at 676−77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 104. The CROA was enacted in order to ensure that consumers of credit repair organization 
services have “the information necessary to make an informed decision” and to protect them from 
“unfair or deceptive advertising and business practices.”  15 U.S.C. § 1679(b)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 105. § 1679c(a). 
 106. CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 668.   
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 669. 
 109. Id. at 668. 
 110. Id. at 669 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)).  
The lone dissenter, Justice Ginsburg, thought the “right to sue” language in the CROA meant “the 
right to litigate in court.”  Id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  She argued that Congress drafted the 
CROA for laypeople to understand and that most lay individuals would interpret “right to sue” as the 
right to sue in court, not a right to go to arbitration.  Id. at 678. 
 111. Id. at 671, 673 (majority opinion). 
 112. Id. at 672.  The Court noted that in 1996, the year the CROA was enacted, arbitration clauses 
were not rare, so Congress would have been clearer if it really wanted to preserve the right of 
consumers to sue in court.  Id. at 672–73. 
 113. See id. at 673.  In other words, absent more precise language prohibiting arbitration or 
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However, neither CompuCredit Corp., nor Concepcion, nor Italian Colors 
Restaurant governs whether the FAA prevents the SEC—a federal regulator 
granted authority by the Exchange Act—and FINRA from conditioning and 
limiting arbitration agreements between brokerage firms and investors in the 
securities industry, because, as discussed below, FINRA and its rules have 
certainly not been silent on the issue of allowing investors to resolve their 
claims by class actions in judicial courts.114 
C. Schwab’s Arbitration Agreement and FINRA’s Rules Collide 
As the Supreme Court repeatedly expressed its clear intent to enforce 
arbitration agreements pursuant to the FAA unless the source of the contrary 
mandate was Congress itself,115 broker-dealers in the securities industry were 
paying attention and taking notes.116  But, contemporaneous with the 
Supreme Court’s evolving precedent regarding the FAA, FINRA was 
created in 2007, and the SEC received increased authority over the securities 
industry, causing broker-dealers to be regulated more and more.117  Hence, a 
showdown between these competing policies was inevitable. 
It all started with the Court’s holding in Concepcion that California state 
law, which made an arbitration agreement’s class action waiver 
unconscionable, had to cede to the FAA’s mandate of enforcing arbitration 
agreements according to their terms.118  In Concepcion’s wake, and in an 
effort “to protect its shareholders and customers from the high costs and 
inefficiencies associated with customer class actions,”119 Schwab amended 
 
requiring litigation in court than “right to sue,” the FAA will cause the arbitration agreement to be 
enforceable.  Id.  The Court’s reference to CROA’s silence regarding arbitration and its citation of 
numerous other statutes in which Congress had explicitly precluded the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements in suits under the statutes, hints at the strong possibility that when the preclusive 
language is included in the statute, the FAA would concede to the other statute and the arbitration 
agreement would be unenforceable.  See id. at 672−73. 
 114. See Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 48. 
 115. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 116. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, supra 
note 5, at ¶ 25 (stating that Schwab amended its customer agreement after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Concepcion).  
 117. Greene, supra note 2, at 207; see also supra Part II.A. 
 118. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 119. Complaint for Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, supra note 5, at 
¶ 25. 
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its customer agreement to include a class action and claims joinder waiver, 
effectively requiring all claims to be arbitrated on an individual basis.120  
But, pursuant to its congressionally granted regulatory authority, FINRA 
instituted a disciplinary action against Schwab on February 1, 2012, for 
violating its rules, which Schwab had agreed to abide by when it became a 
member of NASD in the 1970s.121 
In an attempt to moot the disciplinary proceedings, Schwab filed suit in 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California seeking a 
declaratory judgment that FINRA could not enforce its rules against Schwab 
regarding its class action waiver because doing so would violate the FAA.122  
The district court dismissed the complaint because Schwab failed to exhaust 
FINRA’s administrative remedies, which begins with the parties appearing 
in front of FINRA’s Hearing Panel.123  On May 30, 2012, the Hearing Panel 
heard the parties’ oral arguments and held a non-evidentiary hearing before 
it issued its decision on February 21, 2013.124  Despite finding that Schwab’s 
class action and joinder waivers violated FINRA Rules, the Panel found for 
Schwab regarding the class action waiver, concluding that the FAA and 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the FAA trumped FINRA Rules.125  
However, the Hearing Panel also held that “nothing in the FAA prohibits 
FINRA from authorizing arbitrators to consolidate [or join] multiple 
claims.”126  Dissatisfied, FINRA subsequently appealed the case to its NAC, 
 
 120. Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 
(N.D. Cal. 2012).  For the entire text of the waiver, see supra note 5.  This new agreement was 
distributed to nearly seven million customers.  Id.  Note, however, that Schwab removed the clause 
while the dispute was still pending.  Susan Antilla, Schwab Case Casts Spotlight on Securities 
Arbitration and Its Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2013, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/schwab-case-casts-spotlight-on-securities-arbitration-and-
its-flaws/. 
 121. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1065−67. 
 122. Id. at 1064.  Again, the FAA requires agreements to arbitrate to be enforced according to 
their terms.  See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 123. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1079; see supra notes 41−48 and accompanying 
text. 
 124. Hearing Panel Decision Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Parties’ Cross-Motions for 
Summary Disposition at 1, 4, Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co. (No. 2011029760201) 
(FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Hearing Panel Decision], available 
at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/documents/ohodecisions/p258285.pdf.  
 125. Id. at 1. 
 126. Id. at 43.   
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but before the NAC could issue a decision, FINRA’s Board of Governors 
stepped in and reversed the Hearing Panel’s decision and held for 
enforcement of FINRA’s rules.127  In response, Schwab agreed to not appeal 
its case, pay a $500,000 fine, and no longer include the waiver in its 
customer agreements.128  A decision by a self-interested board of 
governors—and an agreement to settle by a company seeking to maintain its 
“reputation and [the] public[’s] trust”129—is hardly a reliable source to defer 
to regarding the question of whether the FAA trumps contrary rules created 
by a self-regulatory organization and approved by a federal agency.  
Therefore, to fully understand the dispute, an examination of FINRA’s rules 
and Schwab’s class action waiver’s violation of these rules is required. 
Schwab’s class action and claims joinder waivers expressly violated 
FINRA Rules 12204, 12312, and 2268.130  FINRA Rules 12204 and 12312 
are substantive rules governing what kind of disputes can be arbitrated in the 
arbitration forum, as well as the arbitration process itself.131  Rule 2268 
prevents broker-dealers from violating FINRA’s rules as it provides that 
predispute agreements to arbitrate cannot “limit[] or contradict[] the rules of 
any” SRO,132 including FINRA, and also prevents the limiting of a party’s 
ability to file a claim in court that FINRA’s rules permit to be brought in 
court.133  The FINRA Hearing Panel found that Schwab’s arbitration 
provision violated all three rules.134 
FINRA Rule 12204 permits a customer claim to be adjudicated in a 
class action proceeding “in a judicial forum, rather than by arbitration,” and 
states that a customer cannot be forced to arbitrate any claim that is still part 
of a judicial class action.135  Rule 12204’s history also supports this finding 
 
 127. Matthias Rieker, FINRA Wins Appeal in Schwab Class-Action Dispute, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
24, 2014, 7:17 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023033800045795220934 
69025968. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 
1068−69 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 1−2. 
 131. FINRA R. 12204(a), 12204(d), 12312. 
 132. FINRA R. 2268(d)(1). 
 133. FINRA R. 2268(d)(3). 
 134. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 1. 
 135. Id. at 24; see also FINRA R. 12204(a), (d).  In effect, this rule attempts to preserve investors’ 
option of resolving their disputes through class action litigation in court.  See FINRA R. 12204.   
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because in 1992, when the SEC approved the rule, it stated its belief that 
investors should be able to resolve their claims through class actions in 
court.136  FINRA Rules 2268(d)(1) and (d)(3) preserve 12204’s force 
because they are designed to prevent FINRA members from abrogating any 
of FINRA’s rules.137  These provisions work in conjunction to preserve 
investors’ option to bring a class action in court.138  Schwab’s waiver 
provided that neither party may “bring . . . [or] participate . . . in any class 
action.”139  Thus, because Schwab’s waiver prevented customers from 
bringing or participating in class actions in court, the waiver directly 
violated FINRA Rules 2268(d)(1) and (d)(3).140 
FINRA Rule 12312 allows “[o]ne or more parties [to] join multiple 
claims together in the same arbitration.”141  For decades it has been 
understood that FINRA arbitrators have the authority to determine whether 
multiple parties can join and consolidate their claims.142  Again, the 
conjunction of Rules 12312 and 2268(d)(1) prevents any FINRA member 
broker-dealer from using a predispute agreement to interfere with an 
 
 136. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 24.  In fact, in 1992, when the NASD proposed 
these new provisions, NASD stated that one of the reasons for the new provisions was as a “response 
to suggestions by former SEC Chairman David S. Ruder that NASD ‘consider adopting procedures 
that would give investors access to the courts in appropriate cases, including class actions.’”  Id.   
 137. Id. at 25.  Subsection (d)(1) prevents members from limiting or contradicting any FINRA 
Rules, while (d)(3) prohibits members from limiting customers’ ability to file a claim in court that 
FINRA permits to be filed in court.  Id.; see FINRA R. 2268(d)(1), (3). 
 138. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.  In fact, the entire securities industry has 
understood the rules to operate this way for nearly two decades.  Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 
124, at 25. 
 139. Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 
(N.D. Cal. 2012).  See supra note 5 for the entire text of the waiver.  
 140. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 26; see also supra notes 135–39 and 
accompanying text.  To be clear, Schwab’s contract language prohibiting any form of class actions 
violates FINRA Rule 12204’s reservation of investors’ option of participating in judicial class 
actions and FINRA Rule 2268’s mandate that FINRA members—like Schwab—not violate any 
FINRA Rules in their predispute arbitration agreements.  See FINRA R. 2268(d)(1), 2268(d)(3), 
12204; supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 141. FINRA R. 12312.  This rule also serves the interests of the forum and parties by permitting 
the forum to efficiently and consistently resolve similar claims in a single proceeding.  Hearing 
Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 30. 
 142. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 27.  Arbitrators for the NASD were given 
authority to join or consolidate claims in 1984, and arbitrators for the NYSE were given this same 
authority in 1990.  Id.  Hence, securities broker-dealers have been aware that arbitrators of securities 
disputes have had this power for at least twenty-four years.  Id. 
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arbitrator’s authority to determine the joinder or consolidation of multiple 
parties’ claims in arbitration.143  In violation of FINRA Rule 2268, Schwab’s 
waiver stated “the arbitrator(s) shall have no authority to consolidate more 
than one parties’ claims” and that “any actions . . . shall be brought solely in 
[each parties’] individual capacities.”144  This language limited and 
contradicted FINRA Rule 12312’s reservation of authority to arbitrators to 
determine joinder of claims and hence resulted in a violation of FINRA Rule 
2268(d)(1).145  This violation, and subsequent invalidation of this part of 
Schwab’s customer agreement, is important, not regarding the FAA because 
the Hearing Panel correctly held that the FAA does not prevent FINRA from 
compelling compliance with its arbitration joinder and consolidation rules.146  
Rather, it is important for policy reasons, because it causes a class action 
waiver to have a less severe impact on investors’ opportunities to vindicate 
their rights.147 
Therefore, it is undisputed that Schwab violated FINRA’s rules.148  
 
 143. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. 
 144. Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1065–66.  See supra note 5 for the entire text of 
the waiver. 
 145. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 28; see also supra notes 141–44 and 
accompanying text.  In other words, by trying to rob FINRA arbitrators of their claims consolidation 
authority, Schwab’s customer agreement violates FINRA’s express rules reserving this power for 
arbitrators and prohibiting FINRA members from contradicting FINRA Rules in arbitration 
agreements.  See FINRA R. 12312, 2268(d)(1); supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
 146. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 42−45.  Nothing in the FAA mandates that 
“arbitrators should have specified powers or that arbitration must follow a particular procedure,” nor 
does it obligate “arbitration agreements [to] follow any particular rules or procedures.”  Id. at 42 
(citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476, 479 
(1989), and Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)).  Rather, all the 
FAA requires is that parties follow through and “arbitrate if they agreed in writing to arbitrate” and 
that federal courts compel disputes to arbitration if the dispute is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.  
Id.  In fact, consolidation furthers the FAA’s goals of “efficiency and streamlined resolution of 
similar issues” without the characteristics of class actions disfavored by the FAA, such as having to 
notify absent parties.  Id. at 43−44.   
 147. See infra notes 248−49 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 132–45 and accompanying text.  It seems quite obvious that FINRA’s rules 
prohibit class action waivers in brokers’ agreements with customers, just as the Hearing Panel found.  
Hearing Panel Decision, supra 124, at 1.  But, even if it was alleged that FINRA’s rules were 
ambiguous regarding class action waivers, FINRA and the SEC should still receive substantial 
deference to their interpretations of their rules and rule-making authority.  See United States v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975) (“Th[e] consistent and longstanding 
interpretation by the agency charged with administration of the Act[ (the SEC)], while not 
controlling, is entitled to considerable weight.”); Charles Schwab & Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 
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Additionally, Schwab itself accepted that the FAA permits the enforcement 
of FINRA’s arbitration consolidation and joinder rules.149  However, due to 
Schwab’s settlement after the FINRA Board of Governors reversed150 the 
Hearing Panel’s decision,151 it is still unclear which way the higher appellate 
bodies in FINRA’s disciplinary process152 would have decided the issue of 
whether the FAA forecloses FINRA from enforcing its SEC-approved rules 
that permit investors to bypass arbitration and participate in judicial class 
actions. 
III. THE GOVERNORS GOT IT WRONG: AS THE LOWER COURTS HAVE 
SHOWN, THE FAA SHOULD HAVE PREVAILED 
A. The FAA Trumps FINRA Rules 
The FAA undoubtedly applies to the customer agreement between 
Schwab and its investors.153  The most relevant portion of the FAA, § 2, 
states in express terms that it applies to any “contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
 
(“Because of the SEC’s oversight, FINRA Rules approved by the SEC are expressions of federal 
legislative power and have the force and effect of a federal regulation.”); see also Black & Gross, 
supra note 1, at 40−42; Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 152 (2008) 
(opining that FINRA should be treated as a government agency when it is exercising its investigative 
and disciplinary functions); Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action 
Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 424 (2012) (finding it likely that 
FINRA’s rules should receive Chevron deference).  Therefore, regardless of whether the rules at 
issue are ambiguous or not, Schwab’s customer agreement violated them.  
 149. See Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 42−45; see also supra notes 128, 146.  
Schwab agreed “to sever the prohibition on joinder and consolidation of claims” from its customer 
agreement.  Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 16, Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., (No. 
2011029760201) (FINRA NAC June 5, 2013) [hereinafter Brief of the Chamber of Commerce], 
available at http://www.chamberlitigation.com/sites/default/files/cases/files/2013/NCLC%20Amicus 
%20Brief%20--%20Department%20of%20Enforcement%20v.%20Charles%20Schwab%20%28FIN 
RA%29.pdf. 
 150. FINRA Board of Governors Decision, supra note 13.  
 151. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124. 
 152. See supra notes 41−46 and accompanying text. 
 153. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 33–34. 
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thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction.”154  Schwab’s contract 
with its customers regarding how the customers’ money will be invested is a 
contract that involves a transaction in commerce,155 and the parties’ contract 
included an agreement to arbitrate disputes that arise concerning the 
transaction.156  Thus, when applied, the FAA requires that the agreement to 
arbitrate be enforced according to its terms157 unless Congress itself has 
issued a contrary congressional command to override the FAA in the given 
context.158 
Just as with any other statutory directive, Congress—and Congress 
alone—may create an exception to the FAA.159  In addition, the party 
opposing arbitration, in this instance FINRA and its disciplinary team, bears 
the burden of showing that Congress intentionally precluded the waiver of 
 
 154. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 
(2011); supra Part II.B.1. 
 155. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 33.  Separate from the FAA’s command over all 
transactions involving commerce, Schwab’s customer agreements themselves expressly refer to the 
FAA as the governing law of the agreement.  Id. at 34.  Further cementing that the FAA applies is 
the fact that this language has been included in Schwab’s customer agreements for a long time and 
FINRA has never objected, despite its close regulation of its members’ customer agreements.  Id.  
Additionally, federal courts have found that FINRA’s arbitration rules themselves embody an 
agreement between the FINRA member and its customers to arbitrate disputes under the FAA, 
completely separate from the customer-member agreement.  Id.; see e.g., Morgan Keegan & Co. v. 
Silverman, 706 F.3d 562, 564 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that even “in the absence of a separate 
arbitration agreement, a party can compel a FINRA member to participate in FINRA arbitration” as 
long as the other party is a “customer” of the member, the dispute is between the FINRA member 
and its “customer,” and the dispute is related to the FINRA member’s business activities); Wash. 
Square Sec., Inc. v. Aune, 385 F.3d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that NASD Code creates an 
agreement under the FAA that binds the member to take eligible disputes to arbitration, regardless of 
the customer agreement to arbitrate).  So, Schwab’s inclusion of FINRA’s arbitration rules in its 
customer agreement further confirms the FAA’s applicability to Schwab’s customer-member 
agreement.  Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 34.       
 156. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  Although it is a class action waiver, it also acts as 
an agreement to arbitrate.  See Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Inc., 861 F. 
Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 157. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012); see also Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1745; Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). 
 158. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); CompuCredit Corp., 
132 S. Ct. at 669; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
 159. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226–27; Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 34; see also 
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309; CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 669. 
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judicial remedies with regard to the statutory rights at issue.160  Further, in 
order to prove Congress’s intent to prohibit the waiver of a right to a judicial 
forum for a specific claim, Congress’s intent must be discernible and 
deducible either from the statute’s text itself or legislative history, or “from 
an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying 
purposes.”161  The Court’s decision in Concepcion firmly established that 
“no state policy against arbitration can supersede Congress’s statute [(the 
FAA)] favoring arbitration.”162  Later cases such as KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 
Marmet Health Care Center v. Brown, and Nitro–Lift Technologies LLC v. 
Howard were all similar to Concepcion in that they involved applying the 
FAA to override state laws based on state policy concerns.163  However, 
 
 160. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227; see also Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 34−35. 
 161. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227; see also Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 34−35.  
There is also the further presumption, established by the FAA, that “any doubts concerning the scope 
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability.”  Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24−25 (1983)).  So, as with all contracts, the parties’ intentions still 
control, but the intentions are construed in a way that is generous toward arbitration regarding 
arbitration issues.  Id.   
 162. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 35; see also supra Part II.B.2.  When in conflict, 
the FAA displaces the conflicting state law/rule.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Preston v. 
Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)).  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been more express in its 
opinions, reading Concepcion to mean, “unrelated policy concerns, however worthwhile, cannot 
undermine the FAA.”  Coneff v. AT & T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 
Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 963 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Although [a rule that requires 
a claim to be resolved judicially rather than through arbitration] may be based upon the sound public 
policy judgment of the California legislature, we are not free to ignore Concepcion’s holding that 
state public policy cannot trump the FAA when that policy prohibits the arbitration of a ‘particular 
type of claim.’”), aff’d on other grounds en banc, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013).  In the few years 
since Concepcion was decided in 2011, the Court reiterated on numerous occasions that the FAA 
mandates a “federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.”  Hearing Panel Decision, supra 
note 124, at 36; see, e.g., Nitro–Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2012) (per curiam) 
(The FAA “declare[s] a national policy favoring arbitration.” (alteration in original)); Marmet Health 
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (per curiam) (The FAA “reflects an emphatic 
federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.”); CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 669 (The 
FAA establishes “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 
132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011) (per curiam) (“The Federal Arbitration Act reflects an ‘emphatic federal 
policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.’”).  In sum, these decisions further “instruct that claims 
subject to an arbitration agreement covered by the FAA must be sent to arbitration for resolution, 
and that countervailing policy concerns cannot override that mandate.”  Hearing Panel Decision, 
supra note 124, at 36−37. 
 163. Nitro–Lift Techs., LLC, 133 S. Ct. 500 (vacating an Oklahoma state court decision that held 
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CompuCredit Corp. was somewhat different because it did not deal with 
state law or state policy concerns.164 
Instead, CompuCredit Corp., as discussed previously, dealt with the 
CROA—a federal law—showing that the same analysis applies in the 
context of federal statutory claims as well.165  In the Schwab and FINRA 
dispute, however, it is FINRA Rules that are at issue, rather than a state or 
federal statute.166  Again, FINRA promulgates its rules pursuant to its 
authority delegated from the SEC, and the SEC still oversees and must 
approve FINRA’s rules.167  But, although FINRA Rules have the effect and 
force of federal regulations and can preempt state law,168 the rules can only 
be enforced insofar as they are not inconsistent with federal law, which 
includes the FAA.169  Therefore, without a relevant exception created by 
Congress itself that protects FINRA’s rules from being overruled by the 
FAA’s mandate, FINRA’s rules are unenforceable “to the extent they are 
inconsistent with the FAA.”170 
 
non-compete agreements to be unenforceable despite the employee contract containing a valid 
arbitration agreement); Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1201 (invalidating a West Virginia 
state court decision that permitted personal injury and wrongful death claims against nursing homes 
to be brought in court despite a predispute agreement to arbitrate); KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. 23 
(vacating a Florida state court decision that refused to compel the arbitration of two claims because 
two other related claims were not subject to arbitration). 
 164. See CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. 665; see also supra Part II.B.4. 
 165. See CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. 665; see also supra Part II.B.4.  In the analysis, there is a 
requirement of an express congressional intent to prohibit the waiver of a right to resolve a claim in a 
judicial forum or “an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes” in 
order for the FAA to not apply.  McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227; see also Hearing Panel Decision, supra 
note 124, at 38. 
 166. See Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 39; see also supra Part II.C. 
 167. See Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 39; see also supra Part II.C. 
 168. See Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1128−32 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that SRO Rules approved by the SEC preempt state laws when in conflict with each other); 
see also Heilemann v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. CV 10–8623–GW(JCx), 2011 WL 2444812, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that NYSE Rules may have preemptive effect as a federal statute or 
regulation); Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 39−40. 
 169. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 40; see also Tuan Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790, 
798 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that a federal regulation cannot do what a federal statute forbids); Pub. 
Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that EPA regulations do not 
permit the agency to act contrary to a federal statute), rev’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 752 (2004); 
Watson v. Proctor, 161 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A federal regulation in conflict with a federal 
statute is invalid as a matter of law.”). 
 170. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 40.  Recent cases analyzing the conflicts between 
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There simply is, as FINRA’s Hearing Panel concluded, no 
congressionally-created exception to the FAA in the securities context that 
would cause the FAA, and its mandate to enforce arbitration agreements 
according to their terms, to not apply to Schwab’s class action waiver.171  
FINRA’s Enforcement Team, and all other parties who submitted amicus 
briefs in support of FINRA’s Department of Enforcement, were unable to 
identify any congressional intent to maintain the option of judicial class 
actions for consumers in the securities context, or anything that would cause 
FINRA’s rules to rise to a higher priority than the FAA.172  In actuality, 
 
the FAA and rules promulgated by other federal agencies overseeing the labor relations field, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and organizations protecting consumers with regard to 
written warranty laws, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have displayed the necessity of finding 
a contrary congressional command to abrogate an arbitration agreement that eradicates class, 
collective, or representative actions.  See infra Part III.B−C.  Again, these cases concern conflicts 
between federal laws enacted by Congress and rules promulgated by independent un-elected 
agencies, so it is obvious that deference should be given to the body that created the agencies—
Congress—rather than to these independent agencies.  See infra Part III.B−C.   
 171. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 40.  However, some scholars believe that 
FINRA’s rules and regulations, because they were promulgated pursuant to the Exchange Act and 
have the force and effect of federal law, prevail over the FAA via the statutory construction doctrine 
of implied repeal.  See Black & Gross, supra note 1.  In short, the doctrine of implied repeal holds 
that if a later promulgated law is “plainly repugnant” to an earlier made law, then the newest 
enactment impliedly repeals the former law to the extent the two are in conflict.  Id. at 33–34.  The 
Court has refined the test involved in the implied repeal doctrine, adding four factors to evaluate in 
choosing between conflicting federal laws; Professors Black and Gross believe that by applying the 
factors, FINRA Rules promulgated pursuant to the Exchange Act impliedly repeal the FAA.  See 
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Black & Gross, supra note 1, at 
37−40.  However, this argument requires the assumption that Congress, by granting authority to 
FINRA to make rules with SEC oversight and approval, expressly permitted FINRA to make rules 
that conflict with the FAA.  But, this assumption goes too far because FINRA’s rules are  
not the same as a congressional command creating an exception to the FAA.  Rather, 
[FINRA’s rules] represent[] only a determination by FINRA, pursuant to its general 
authority to promulgate Rules, to make an exception to the FAA.  FINRA’s general 
authority to promulgate rules is not a congressional command to promulgate the 
particular [r]ule carving out an exception to the FAA.   
Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 41.  Thus, it seems much more likely that the doctrine of 
implied repeal does not apply and actual congressional promulgation evidencing an exception to the 
FAA must be found in order to not enforce the FAA.  Id.   
 172. See Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 40.  The Board of Governors held that 
Congress’s delegation of authority to the SEC to approve FINRA’s rules causes FINRA Rules to 
become some form of a “congressional command,” and thus deserving of deference.  FINRA Board 
of Governor’s Decision, supra note 13, at 18–21.  The Board then analyzed cases involving conflicts 
between antitrust laws and securities laws as an analogy to support its view that FINRA’s rules 
override the FAA.  Id. at 21–31.  However, this analysis concentrating on FINRA and the SEC’s 
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judicial precedent hints at the conclusion that the FAA should have applied 
and governed Schwab’s arbitration agreement.173  The Court has previously 
held that the FAA requires the arbitration of claims covered by predispute 
arbitration agreements, even with regard to securities claims under the 
Exchange Act or the Securities Act.174  Therefore, regarding Schwab’s 
customer agreement that foreclosed investors’ opportunity to participate in 
judicial class actions, the FAA should have applied and prevented the 
enforcement of FINRA’s rules that would preserve that option for 
investors.175 
 
authority to make and approve rules focuses on the wrong issue.  Just because an agency or 
organization has authority to promulgate rules does not mean it has the power to make rules in 
conflict with other congressional objectives.  See infra note 183 and accompanying text.  Instead, the 
focus should be on the FAA and its effect on contrary regulations promulgated by federal agencies.  
See infra Part III.B–C.  The Board also curtly dismissed the idea that Italian Colors or Concepcion 
had anything to provide to its analysis.  FINRA Board of Governors Decision, supra note 13, at 23–
24.  But this short shrift fails to adequately acknowledge the substantial power the FAA maintains in 
the eyes of the Supreme Court.  See supra Part II.B. 
 173. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 41; see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740, 1751−53 (2011) (discussing the benefits of bilateral arbitration as opposed to classwide 
arbitration); see also supra note 163 and accompanying text.  The Court said expressly in 
Concepcion that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”  Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1748. 
 174. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 41.  In McMahon, the Court held that the FAA 
applies to claims under the Exchange Act because no congressional intent to require a judicial forum 
to resolve Exchange Act claims could be found or discerned from the Exchange Act’s text.  
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).  Two years later the Court held 
similarly regarding the Securities Act of 1933 that claims under the Act governed by a predispute 
arbitration agreement were enforceable under the FAA and that resolution of claims only in a 
judicial forum is not required.  Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 
(1989). 
 175. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 33−41.  Note that FINRA would have only been 
precluded from enforcing its rules that preserve investors’ right to participate in judicial class 
actions, and that FINRA would have still been able to enforce its rules regarding FINRA’s 
arbitrators’ power of joinder and consolidation of claims and parties.  Id. at 42−45.  This is true 
because the Court has found that the FAA does not require arbitration agreements to follow specific 
rules or procedures, instead allowing arbitrators substantial freedom in deciding how the arbitration 
should proceed.  Id. at 42; see, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 81 (2002) 
(finding that the interpretation of a NASD Arbitration Rule about a six-year eligibility limit was to 
be determined by the arbitrators rather than a court); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476, 479 (1989).   
[Vol. 42: 109, 2014] The Great and Powerful FAA 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
137 
B. The FAA Supersedes the NLRB’s Interpretations of the NLRA 
The labor relations field provides further support for the proposition that 
an agency or regulatory organization’s own policy-based rules and 
interpretation of a federal statute granting it authority is not enough to rise to 
the level of a congressional command capable of overriding a contrary 
federal statute.176  In recent cases within the labor relations law field, district 
and circuit courts have repeatedly held that an agency or organization’s own 
view that its power-granting statute overrides the FAA is unpersuasive and 
unavailing.177 
A recent Fifth Circuit case exemplifying this is D.R. Horton, Inc. v. 
NLRB.178  Horton is a company that builds homes in over twenty states, and 
in 2006, Horton began requiring all of its employees to sign a Mutual 
Arbitration Agreement as a condition of employment.179  The agreement 
provided that both Horton and the employee waived all rights to “trial[s] in 
court,” that all disputes between the parties would be “determined 
exclusively” by arbitration, and that the arbitrator would not be able to 
“consolidate the claims of other employees” or “fashion a proceeding as a 
class or collective action.”180  Michael Cuda, one of Horton’s employees, 
“filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that the class-action waiver 
violated the National Labor Relations Act ([NLRA]).”181  The National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that the class action waiver violated 
the NLRA, but the Board’s decision was appealed to the Fifth Circuit.182 
 
 176. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 40 n.92. 
 177. Id.; see also infra note 187. 
 178. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 179. Id. at 348. 
 180. Id.  This agreement is strikingly similar to Schwab’s class action waiver.  See supra note 5 
and accompanying text. 
 181. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 349.  
 182. Id.  The relevant provision of the NLRA is § 7, which provides that: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and 
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such 
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring 
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in 
section 158(a)(3) of this title. 
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (emphasis added); D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 355.  Thus, the Board 
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The Fifth Circuit noted that it would grant the NLRB’s interpretations 
some deference, but noted, “the Board has not been commissioned to 
effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it 
may wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives,” 
such as the FAA.183  The Fifth Circuit first found that Concepcion prevented 
the NLRA from falling within the FAA’s saving clause184 because 
“[r]equiring a class mechanism is an actual impediment to arbitration and 
violates the FAA.”185  Next, the court found that there was no express 
congressional intent in the NLRA’s text or its legislative history, nor was 
there an inherent conflict between the two Acts’ purposes to override the 
FAA.186  Additionally, the court was “loath to create a circuit split” because 
each of the other “circuits to consider the issue ha[d] either suggested or 
expressly stated that they would not defer to the NLRB’s rationale, and held 
arbitration agreements containing class waivers enforceable.”187  Hence, in 
 
found that this “concerted activities” language created a substantive right and that Horton’s Mutual 
Arbitration Agreement, with its class action waiver, infringed on this right.  D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 
F.3d at 355–56. 
 183. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 356 (quoting S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)).  
The court further stated that it had “never deferred to the Board's remedial preferences where such 
preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and policies unrelated to the NLRA.”  Id. 
(quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144 (2002)).  This is the same 
deference, but with limits based on other congressional statutes, which FINRA should be granted 
with its interpretations of the Exchange and Securities Acts.  See supra note 171 and accompanying 
text. 
 184. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 185. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 360.  The Fifth Circuit listed all of the factors, described in 
Concepcion, inherent in class proceedings that take away from the biggest benefits of arbitration, 
like informality, efficiency, and low costs.  Id. at 359.  Additionally, the court noted that if 
companies are faced with “inevitable class arbitration, companies would have less incentive to 
continue resolving potentially duplicative claims on an individual basis.”  Id.  Therefore, these 
impediments to arbitration from class proceedings and the discouragement of employers to use 
individual arbitration caused the “equity” portion of the saving clause not to be “a basis for 
invalidating the waiver of class procedures in the arbitration agreement.”  Id. at 359–60. 
 186. Id. at 360−61.  Regarding the inherent conflict issue, the Fifth Circuit was persuaded that a 
conflict did not exist because the Supreme Court’s and circuit courts’ previous decisions foreclosed 
the idea that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) or Federal Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) provided a substantive right to proceed collectively.  Id. at 357−58 (citing 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) (ADEA); Carter v. Countrywide 
Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004) (FLSA); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 
F.3d 496, 506 (4th Cir. 2002); Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 319−20 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 187. Id. at 362 (citing Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 734 F.3d 871, 873−74 (9th Cir. 2013), 
amended and superseded by 744 F.3d 1072, 1075 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Sutherland v. 
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the field of labor relations law, it is well-settled that a contrary congressional 
command must be found in order to invalidate a class action waiver and that 
the NLRB’s interpretation of the FLSA, the NLRA, or the ADEA, as 
overriding the FAA, is incorrect.188  The securities industry, FINRA Rules, 
and FINRA’s interpretation of the Securities and Exchange Acts are 
analogous to the NLRB and the labor relations field, and thus, should have 
been treated the same way: by allowing the FAA to apply and override 
FINRA Rules.189  But the NLRB is not the only government entity whose 
rule interpretations have fallen when in conflict with the FAA, as the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) has experienced the same defeat.190 
C. The FAA Abrogates the FTC’s Rules Regarding the MMWA 
Courts have enforced the FAA’s mandate in the face of conflicting 
agency rules in contexts other than the labor relations field, further 
supporting the proposition that FINRA Rules should not have received 
deference with regard to the Schwab dispute.191  One such context is with 
warranties of consumer goods and the FTC’s interpretation of the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), as well as the Commission’s 
rules promulgated pursuant to the Act.192  The MMWA was passed in 1975 
“to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent 
deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer 
products.”193  The MMWA also provided that if a warrantor includes a 
dispute settlement procedure in the warranty, it must comply with the rules 
 
Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297–98 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 
1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013)).  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s decision was not an anomaly, but rather is 
the prevailing viewpoint among the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which gives the decision 
greater weight. 
 188. Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 40 n.92; see supra notes 176−87 and 
accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 176−87 and accompanying text. 
 190. See infra Part III.C. 
 191. See supra Part III.A. 
 192. See Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002); Walton v. Rose Mobile 
Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 40 
n.92. 
 193. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1272 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1994)).  The MMWA was passed in 
response to the growing number of customer complaints over the inadequacy of consumer good 
warranties.  Id. 
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prescribed by the FTC.194  The FTC had explicitly expressed that predispute 
alternative dispute resolution procedures can only be a “precursor to 
litigation and never binding,”195 which has contradicted multiple warranty-
granting companies’ binding arbitration agreements.196  Both circuits to 
consider the issue, the Fifth and the Eleventh, found that the FAA and 
Supreme Court precedent favoring arbitration override the MMWA and the 
FTC’s Rules.197 
The Eleventh Circuit most recently tackled the issue in 2002 in Davis v. 
Southern Energy Homes, Inc., in which the Davises purchased a home from 
Southern Energy and signed a “binding arbitration agreement contained 
within the manufactured home’s written warranty.”198  The Davises found 
multiple defects in the home and sued for multiple common law claims as 
well as for violations of the MMWA.199  The case was appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit,200 with Southern Energy motioning to compel arbitration of 
the dispute, and the Davises arguing that the MMWA and the FTC’s rules 
preclude enforcement of binding arbitration agreements with respect to 
written warranty claims.201 
The Eleventh Circuit found no congressional intent in the MMWA to 
preclude arbitration of a claim under it,202 so the court applied a Chevron 
 
 194. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (2012). 
 195. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1277 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 700.8 (2002)). 
 196. See, e.g., id. at 1270.  Therefore, the situation is strikingly similar, though with a different 
congressional act at issue, to Schwab’s dispute with FINRA because FINRA is charged, just like the 
FTC and the MMWA, with promulgating rules pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Acts; and, 
again, FINRA’s rules disfavor arbitration in the face of the FAA just like the FTC’s rules on dispute 
resolution procedures over MMWA violations disfavor arbitration by precluding binding arbitration.  
See supra Part II.C.  
 197. See Davis, 305 F.3d 1268; Walton, 298 F.3d 470.  The Ninth Circuit considered this issue, 
contrarily finding that the buyer’s MMWA warranty claims were not arbitrable, but this decision 
was later withdrawn.  Kolev v. Euromotors W./The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2011), 
withdrawn, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 198. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1270. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id.  The Davises filed suit in the circuit court of Lowndes County, Alabama, but Southern 
Energy removed the case to federal court.  Id.  The district court denied Southern Energy’s motion to 
compel arbitration pursuant to the parties’ arbitration agreement, so Southern Energy appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit.  Id.   
 201. Id. at 1271. 
 202. Id. at 1274−77.  In coming to this determination, the Eleventh Circuit examined the 
MMWA’s text, legislative history, and whether there was an inherent conflict between the statute’s 
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analysis203 to determine whether it should grant deference to the FTC’s 
interpretation of the MMWA.204  For the second part of the Chevron 
analysis, the court examined the reasonableness of the FTC’s regulations and 
in doing so, looked at the FTC’s underlying rationale.205 
In its legislative regulations, the FTC explained its decision that 
warranty disputes may not be binding under the MMWA based on 
Congress’s grant of concurrent jurisdiction for resolution of breach of 
warranty disputes to “state and federal courts;”206 however, the Eleventh 
Circuit held, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, that a statute merely 
providing for a judicial forum does not make a binding arbitration agreement 
unenforceable under the FAA.207  Thus, the FTC’s motive for its rule was 
contradictory to the Supreme Court’s rationale in many other cases where it 
had required an explicit preclusion of arbitration,208 and thus was an 
unreasonable interpretation of the MMWA.209  This unreasonable 
 
underlying purpose and arbitration, but found no intent by Congress, nor an inherent conflict in the 
statute’s purposes, which would require precluding arbitration.  Id.  This was an application of the 
test, articulated in McMahon, just as the Hearing Panel applied the test in its decision in the Schwab 
and FINRA dispute.  See Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226−27 (1987); 
Hearing Panel Decision, supra note 124, at 40−41. 
 203. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Chevron 
prescribes a two-part test, first asking “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue,” and if not, then evaluating “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”  Id. at 842−43.  
 204. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1277−80.  The court found that the first prong of the Chevron analysis 
favored not granting deference to the FTC because, based on its analysis of the MMWA under the 
Shearson test, Congress failed to directly address binding arbitration in the MMWA.  Id. at 1278.  
So, the court moved to an analysis of the second prong.  Id. at 1278−80. 
 205. Id.  
 206. The FTC believed that the language of “[§] 110(d) of the Act gives state and federal courts 
jurisdiction over suits for breach of warranty,” also known as concurrent jurisdiction, and that this 
grant of jurisdiction made it improper for resolution of warranty disputes in arbitration to be binding.  
Id. at 1278 (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 700.8). 
 207. Id. at 1279.   
 208. See infra notes 214−20. 
 209. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1279−80.  The FTC also acknowledged its additional motive that it is “not 
now convinced that any guidelines which it set out could ensure sufficient protection for 
consumers,” and the Eleventh Circuit found this rationale unreasonable as well, in light of Supreme 
Court precedent.  Id. at 1279.  The court expressly acknowledged that contrary to the FTC’s views 
that arbitration negatively affects consumers, “the Supreme Court holds that arbitration is favorable 
to the individual.”  Id.; see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) 
(stating that “arbitration’s advantages often would seem helpful to individuals, say, complaining 
about a product, who need a less expensive alternative to litigation”).  This is essentially FINRA’s 
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interpretation caused the court to refuse to defer to the FTC’s regulations 
and interpretation of the MMWA regarding binding arbitration agreements 
in written warranty agreements, making the arbitration agreement 
enforceable pursuant to the FAA.210 
The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits’ upholding of binding agreements to 
arbitrate211 was not atypical or groundbreaking, but perfectly in line with 
Supreme Court precedent.212  In their decisions, both circuits recognized the 
consistency and strength of Supreme Court precedent enforcing arbitration 
agreements, noting that “[i]n every case the Supreme Court has considered 
involving a statutory right that does not explicitly preclude arbitration, it has 
upheld the application of the FAA.”213  The list of statutes under which the 
Court has enforced arbitration agreements, due to the absence of explicit 
preclusion of arbitration, include: the Truth in Lending Act,214 the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act,215 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act,216 the Credit Repair Organizations Act,217 the Sherman 
Act,218 the Securities Act of 1933,219 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.220  Therefore, even with regard to acts or statutes that the Supreme 
Court has not itself expressly dealt with, its overwhelming precedent of 
enforcing arbitration agreements requires lower courts, government 
agencies, and SROs to follow suit.  These entities must follow this lead, 
 
rationale for its rules prohibiting class action waivers, that the option of participating in judicial class 
actions is required to sufficiently protect investors, which also contradicts Supreme Court precedent 
that has held arbitration as favorable for the individual.  See supra Part II.A, C.  So, just as the 
Eleventh Circuit determined that this rationale of protecting consumers was unreasonable, Davis, 
305 F.3d at 1280, so too is the rationale of protecting investors by preserving a judicial class action 
alternative for dissatisfied investors. 
 210. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1280. 
 211. See Davis, 305 F.3d 1268; Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
 212. See infra notes 213−20 and accompanying text. 
 213. Walton, 298 F.3d at 474 (emphasis added); see also Davis, 305 F.3d at 1273. 
 214. Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 88−92 (2000). 
 215. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
 216. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987).  
 217. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 671–73 (2012). 
 218. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628−40 (1985). 
 219. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–86 (1989). 
 220. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238. 
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despite each entity’s own contrary policy observations, because the Supreme 
Court’s policy analysis, which trumps all other analyses, is that arbitration 
adequately protects individuals.221 
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS: ENFORCEMENT OF SCHWAB’S CLASS ACTION 
WAIVER, CONTRARY TO POPULAR OPINION, WOULD HAVE ACTUALLY 
BENEFITED INVESTORS 
Many scholars and amici curiae have expressed a grave fear that 
permitting Schwab to include a class action waiver in its customer 
agreements would have caused numerous other broker-dealers to follow suit 
and effectively leave investors with small-value claims without protection or 
remedies.222  However, although other broker-dealers may have followed 
Schwab’s lead (if it had won) by putting class action waivers in their 
 
 221. See supra Part III.A–C. 
 222. See Brief of Amici Professors Barbara Black & Jill Gross in Support of FINRA’s Opening 
Brief at 15–17, Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co. (No. 2011029760201) (FINRA 
NAC May 6, 2013), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/amicus-brief-final.pdf (“The 
ability of brokerage customers to bring class actions in appropriate cases provides important investor 
protection, particularly for customers with small-value claims, who may have no effective remedy 
apart from a class action because of the costs of pursuing individual claims.”); Amicus Curiae Brief 
of Public Investors Arbitration Bar Ass’n in Support of FINRA’s Department of Enforcement at 4, 
Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co (No. 2011029760201) (FINRA NAC May 7, 2013), 
available at http://piaba.org/system/files/pdfs/Department%20of%20Enforcement%20vs%20Charles 
%20Schwab%20and%20Company%2C%20Inc.%2C%20PIABA%20Amicus%20%28May%207%2
C%202013%29.pdf (“Investors with small claims would be left wholly without an adequate forum 
or remedy to seek redress of their claims.”); Letter from William F. Gavin, Sec’y of the 
Commonwealth of Mass., to Charles R. Schwab, Chairman of the Bd. (Feb. 26, 2013) [hereinafter 
Letter from William F. Gavin], available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctschwabarb/Schwab-
letter.pdf (“This ruling [permitting Schwab’s class action waiver] is akin to giving every rogue 
broker-dealer the green light to steal from their customers in small dollar amounts.”); Amicus Curiae 
Brief of the North American Securities Administrators Ass’n, Inc. at 16–17, Dep’t of Enforcement v. 
Charles Schwab & Co (No. 2011029760201) (FINRA NAC May 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Amicus-Curiae_Schwab.pdf (“[The Hearing 
Panel’s decision permitting Schwab’s class action waiver has] placed investors in imminent harm by 
precluding their ability to seek redress for small dollar claims.”); Amended Brief of Amici Curiae 
AARP, National Consumer Law Center, & Public Justice, P.C. in Support of Complainant at 2, 
Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co (No. 2011029760201) (FINRA NAC May 8, 2013, 
available at http://publicjustice.net/sites/default/files/downloads/Department-of-Enforcement-v-
Schwab-Amici-Brief-of-AARP-NCLC-Public-Justice-8May2013.pdf (“Unless FINRA enforces its 
own Rules to preserve class actions, there will be no effective protection for investors.”).  
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customer agreements,223 class actions are not that beneficial to investors or 
necessary for deterrence of wrongdoing by broker-dealers, and arbitration is 
more economical, faster, and more efficient for everyone involved in the 
securities industry—even when brought individually.224 
A. Investors Experience Lower Costs and Faster Recoveries in FINRA 
Arbitrations 
Amongst all the assertions that investors’ inability to bring class actions 
in court will rob them of any means of redress,225 it has been forgotten that 
FINRA arbitrations are “a proven mechanism for providing fair outcomes to 
customers of broker-dealers.”226  Individual arbitration before FINRA is a 
“fast, inexpensive, and fair way for investors to obtain redress for any harms 
they may have suffered.”227  In fact, investors who participate in FINRA 
arbitrations experience fewer costs and more wins than their counterparts 
who litigate in court.228  One scholar, and former president of the American 
 
 223. Dan Jamieson, Schwab’s Class Action Win a Blueprint for Other Firms, INVESTMENTNEWS 
(Feb. 24, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130224/REG/302249989 
(“More brokerage firms are expected to follow the lead of The Charles Schwab Corp. and demand 
that customers give up their right to file class actions against them.”). 
 224. See infra Part IV.A−C; see also Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive 
Arbitration Agreements—With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. 
AM. ARB. 251, 259 (2006) (“[A]rbitration arising out of adhesive agreements is an entrepreneurial, 
private-sector innovation producing what disputing parties want: quick, inexpensive, common-sense 
adjudication of disputes.  By contrast, civil litigation in the public-sector court system is slow and 
archaic, full of legalistic jargon, technicalities and formalities that produce a lot more work for 
lawyers without producing a corresponding increase in justice for the disputing parties who have to 
pay the lawyers.”). 
 225. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 226. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 2.  The Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States “represents 300,000 direct members and . . . more than three million companies and 
professional organizations of every size,” and its members have substantial experience before 
FINRA and have “intimate familiarity with how class-action litigation functions (or more precisely, 
fails to function) in practice.”  Id. at 1–2.   
 227. Id. at 2; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (“In 
bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to 
realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the 
ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.” (emphasis added) (quoting 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010))). 
 228. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 2; see also Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (“[A]rbitration’s advantages often would seem helpful to 
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Bar Association, has estimated that investors can arbitrate their claims with 
FINRA for at least half, and maybe even a quarter, of the cost of litigating in 
court.229  Investors accrue an additional cost savings due to more narrowly 
tailored discovery in FINRA arbitration than in federal litigation.230  So, 
substantial evidence supports the argument that the lower discovery costs 
and cheaper filing fees in securities’ arbitration result in a “relative 
economic benefit favoring arbitration for the customer.”231 
Also, investors save more money due to FINRA’s quick arbitrations, as 
they are resolved in a “fraction of the time that a lawsuit in federal or state 
court would take.”232  Through August of 2014, FINRA’s arbitration 
program has resolved regular cases in an average of 18.3 months and 
simplified arbitrations in just 8.1 months.233  By comparison, civil cases in 
 
individuals . . . who need a less expensive alternative to litigation.”).  Individuals with small value 
claims are better off going to arbitration because “the costs and delays of [court litigation] could eat 
up the value of an eventual small recovery.”  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281. 
 229. WILLIAM G. PAUL, ARBITRATION V. LITIGATION IN ENERGY CASES 3 (2002).  Another study 
of the period between October 1, 1987, and June 30, 1988 (nearly twenty-five years ago), run by 
Deloitte Haskins found that “the average legal costs are $12,000 less in arbitration than for 
litigation.”  J. KIRKLAND GRANT, SECURITIES ARBITRATION FOR BROKERS, ATTORNEYS, AND 
INVESTORS 96 (1994).  Additionally, FINRA has specifically tailored its fee schedule for customers 
with small claims, as the filing fee is only $50 for claims up to $1,000, and only $75 for claims up to 
$2,500.  FINRA R. 12900(a)(1).  This fee may be deferred in part, or whole, based upon a showing 
of financial hardship, or the arbitrator could allocate payment of the fee to the defendant, rather than 
the customer/investor.  FINRA R. 12900(a)(1), (d).        
 230. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery is guided by the parties, which often 
results in very broad and costly requests for disclosure, and parties are also allowed to depose up to 
ten witnesses before trial without leave of the court.  SEC. INDUST. & FIN. MKTS ASS’N, WHITE 
PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 28 (2007), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/societies/sifma_compliance_and_legal_society/whitepaperonarb
itration-october2007.pdf (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 30).  In contrast, FINRA arbitrations limit 
discovery to “presumptively discoverable material enumerated on specific discovery lists,” 
interrogatories are for the most part impermissible, and “depositions are strongly discouraged,” 
which results in a more streamlined (and less costly) discovery process than with typical court 
proceedings.  Id. at 28–29 (citing CODE OF ARB. P. § 12506, 12507(a)(1), 12510).  
 231. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146, 159 (D. Mass. 1988), aff’d, 883 F.2d 1114 
(1st Cir. 1989). 
 232. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 2.  FINRA arbitrations under 
$50,000—which are permitted to go through FINRA’s “simplified arbitration procedures” under 
FINRA Rule 12800—are resolved in “less than a third of the time it takes to litigate in the 
overburdened federal and state court systems.”  Id. at 6.  
 233. Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINR 
ADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/index.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).  
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federal court are currently facing median delays of 23.4 months.234  State 
courts are faring even worse due to funding crises causing courtrooms to 
close,235 but, even in 2001, studies showed that a contract suit tried “before a 
jury took slightly over 2 years (25 months) on average to proceed from filing 
to disposition.”236  Thus, wronged investors, especially those with small 
value claims eligible for simplified arbitration status, can avoid the delays 
that exist in the overburdened federal and state courts and get their 
grievances resolved more quickly and more easily through FINRA’s 
bilateral arbitrations.237 
B. Investors Experience Higher Recovery Rates and Recover Greater 
Portions of Their Losses in Arbitration 
Contrary to popular belief,238 securities class actions do not usually end 
with better results for investors than individual FINRA arbitrations.239  First, 
less than 10% of intended class action suits ever get certified due to 
heightened pleading standards.240  Second, of the portion of cases that are 
lucky enough to gain certification, many are rejected at summary 
 
 234. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics Table. C-5, 
(2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStati 
stics/2012/tables/C05Mar12.pdf (reporting data for the period of April 1, 2011, through March 31, 
2012). 
 235. California, for example, due to $653 million in budget cuts, has closed “courtrooms and 
clerk’s offices in 24 counties across the state,” resulting in significant litigation delays.  Erin Coe, 
Calif. Chief Justice Warns of Looming Case Delays, LAW360 (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://www.law360.com/legalindustry/articles/319086.  Some states, like New Hampshire, for 
instance, have even gone so far as to defer all civil trials for one year.  Brief of the Chamber of 
Commerce, supra note 149, at 7–8. 
 236. See THOMAS H. COHEN, CONTRACT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 2 
(2005), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctvlc01.pdf (selected finding by the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics). 
 237. See supra notes 232–36 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 239. See infra notes 240−49 and accompanying text. 
 240. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 8.  These heightened pleading 
standards are a result of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).  See 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012); see also Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 8.  Of the 
cases that are not resolved before filing for certification, 18% have their motions for certification 
denied.  RENZO COMOLLI ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2012 
FULL-YEAR REVIEW 20 (2013). 
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judgment.241  Third, class actions are now almost as likely to be dismissed as 
they are to result in settlement, further reducing the amount of class actions 
that result in restitution for investors.242  Fourth, of the cases that actually 
result in settlement, investors usually only recoup a tiny fraction of their 
experienced losses.243  Finally, substantial attorneys’ fees and costs further 
contribute to the reduction of compensation for investors.244  Thus, the 
chances of an investor recovering any substantial amount of his loss is very 
 
 241. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 8.  For cases in which defendants 
filed summary judgment motions, 37.2% of the motions are granted.  COMOLLI ET AL., supra note 
240, at 22.    
 242. COMOLLI ET AL., supra note 240, at 24.  Of all the cases filed between 2007 and 2009, 
including cases that have not yet reached resolution, 44%−49% have already been dismissed, and, 
according to the data, these rates of dismissal appear to be rising.  Id.  It is also important to note that 
significant defense costs are inflicted on the parties sued, even if the defendants are lucky enough to 
prevent class certification, win on summary judgment, or obtain a case dismissal.  Brief of the 
Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 11.  Not to mention the costs of “business disruptions 
caused by compliance with unnecessarily burdensome discovery requests,” which are an important 
weapon for plaintiffs seeking to force a defendant into a blackmail-like settlement.  Id. 
 243. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 13.  To be precise, in 2012, the 
median ratio of settlement recovery to investor losses was just 1.8%, and this rate has been 
decreasing since the passage of the PSLRA.  COMOLLI ET AL., supra note 240, at 32–33 (calculating 
investors’ losses based on “the aggregate amount that investors lost from buying the defendant’s 
stock rather than investing in the broader market during the alleged class period”).  This low loss 
recovery rate and the continued perpetuation of class actions results in “the systematic 
undercompensation of investors with legitimate claims,” with the occasional windfall to investors 
with meritless claims.  Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 20−21. 
 244. For the time period of January 2010 to December 2012, plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and 
expenses were 34.2% of the settlement value of cases settled for less than $5 million, and were 
12.6% of the settlement value of cases settled for greater than or equal to $1 billion.  COMOLLI ET 
AL., supra note 240, at 34.  In fact, just ten class action settlements alone resulted in plaintiffs’ 
attorneys receiving over $2.7 billion in fees and expenses.  Id. at 30–31.  Thus, lawyers in pursuit of 
the big payday that a class action settlement can provide is one of the main reasons for this continued 
push toward class actions instead of arbitrations.  Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 
149 at 21–22.  So, FINRA’s prevention of the enforcement of arbitration agreements like Schwab’s 
“distorts the market for legal services in FINRA arbitrations.”  Id. at 21.  There are lawyers willing 
to represent investors in FINRA arbitrations evidenced by associations like the Public Investors 
Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA) who have members across the country.  See About PIABA, 
PIABA, http://piaba.org/about-piaba (last visited Oct. 10, 2014) (claiming lawyers in forty-four 
states, Puerto Rico, and Japan).  However, a large segment of the bar only work on class actions due 
to the high potential award from a contingency fee after a class action victory that just is not as 
substantial in individual arbitrations.  Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 21.  
Hence, these lawyers that would otherwise be representing investors in FINRA arbitrations based on 
reasonable hourly rates instead chase the chance of “windfall recoveries” in class actions “like moths 
to a flame” to the detriment of investors.  Id. at 21–22. 
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slim due to the difficulty in gaining class certification and surviving 
dismissal combined with the low amount of recovery as a percent of total 
losses after substantial attorneys’ fees have been incurred.245 
In contrast, FINRA arbitrations continually provide efficient 
compensation to claimants, with approximately 77% of FINRA arbitrations 
filed by customers in 2013 resulting in recovery for investors.246  The 
premise that FINRA arbitration is a preferable route to recovery of investors’ 
claims is further supported by the trend of class members of securities class 
actions opting out in favor of arbitrating their claims individually.247  
Additionally, due to the FAA allowing FINRA to enforce its rules, thereby 
permitting joinder and consolidation of claims in arbitration,248 FINRA 
arbitration is favorable because investors with similar claims can still “pool 
resources and share costs” in pursuit of their claims.249  Therefore, it is 
evident that FINRA arbitrations better compensate investors after losses than 
 
 245. See supra notes 240−44 and accompanying text. 
 246. Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 233 (listing results of customer claimant arbitration 
award cases).  Additionally, resolving claims through individual arbitration ensures that each 
individual investor is appropriately compensated for his individual loss and eliminates the windfall 
to investors with meritless claims. 
 247. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 14–15; see also, e.g., Prudential Sec. 
Inc. Ltd. P’ship Litig. v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 107 F.3d 3, 1996 WL 739258, at *1–2 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(unpublished decision) (noting that so many class members opted out of proposed settlement as to 
trigger “blow provision” in settlement agreement).  Examples include the AOL-Time Warner 
securities-fraud settlement in which many of the class members who opted out “reported individual 
recoveries of between 6.5 and 50 times the amount they would have recovered under the class 
settlement” and the Tyco securities-fraud class action in which some investors who opted out and 
arbitrated individually recovered 80% of their losses when they would have only received about 3% 
of their losses by participating in the class action settlement.  Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, 
supra note 149, at 15. 
 248. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 249. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 3−4.  Nothing prevents investors 
from cooperating with one another to develop and share evidence, theories of liability, attorney 
preparation, and expert witness fees, among multiple cases.  Id. at 3, 16.  In fact, due to the 
significant financial incentives, plaintiffs’ attorneys have started to pursue serial individual 
arbitrations.  Id. at 17.  For example, the attorney for a class action that was dismissed against AT&T 
subsequently filed “separate demands for arbitration on behalf of over 1,000 claimants—each 
making virtually identical allegations and relying on the same expert witness.”  Id. at 17−18.  This 
strategy is not unique, as other lawyers have taken similar actions, and thanks to today’s social 
media and the Internet, reaching potential claimants with similar claims who can share costs has 
become quite easy.  Id.; see also Carolyn Whetzel & Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Opt Out’s Use of Social 
Media Against Honda in Small Claim Win Possible “Game Changer”, in BLOOMBERG BNA CLASS 
ACTION LITIGATION REPORT (2012). 
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class actions, making Schwab’s proposed class action waiver much less 
problematic than it would initially seem.250 
C. Class Actions Are Not Necessary to Protect, and May Actually Harm, 
Investors 
FINRA and many other organizations and individuals argued, “Unless 
FINRA enforces its own Rules to preserve class actions [for investors as an 
alternative to arbitration], there will be no effective protection for 
investors.”251  However, this is just not true.252  First, it would seem to be a 
rare situation in which a broker-dealer’s “fraudulent or misleading practices 
could survive a wave of individual arbitrations” and the mass of negative 
publicity that would surely accompany them.253  Second, FINRA itself, via 
its Department of Enforcement, “ha[s] ample power to police misconduct”254 
 
 250. See supra notes 240−49 and accompanying text. 
 251. Amended Brief of Amici Curiae AARP, supra note 222, at 2; see also supra note 222 and 
accompanying text. 
 252. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 18. 
 253. Id.  To prove this point, one need look no further than the vast amount of publicity Schwab’s 
proposed class action waiver created, including law review articles, Internet articles and blogs, and a 
number of letters and amicus curiae briefs submitted to the NAC after the Hearing Panel’s decision.  
See, e.g., Black & Gross, supra note 1 (law review article); Jamieson, supra note 223 (internet 
article); Singer, supra note 63 (internet blog); Arduengo, supra note 63 (internet blog); Letter from 
William F. Gavin, supra note 222 (letter); supra note 222 and accompanying text (listing amicus 
curiae briefs).  If this much publicity is generated by a broker-dealer simply amending its customer 
agreement, it would seem that a broker-dealer would receive much more negative attention and 
notoriety after actually illegally wronging its investors. 
 254. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 18−19; see also supra note 40 and 
accompanying text.  FINRA’s police power over its broker-dealer members and associated persons 
is evidenced by the vast number of ways FINRA can punish broker-dealers for violating any of 
numerous different rules, regulations, and laws as described in FINRA Rule 8310(a): 
After compliance with the Rule 9000 Series, FINRA may impose one or more of the 
following sanctions on a member or person associated with a member for each violation 
of the federal securities laws, rules or regulations thereunder, the rules of the Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board, or FINRA rules, or may impose one or more of the 
following sanctions on a member or person associated with a member for any neglect or 
refusal to comply with an order, direction, or decision issued under the FINRA rules: (1) 
censure a member or person associated with a member; (2) impose a fine upon a member 
or person associated with a member; (3) suspend the membership of a member or suspend 
the registration of a person associated with a member for a definite period or a period 
contingent on the performance of a particular act; (4) expel a member, cancel the 
membership of a member, or revoke or cancel the registration of a person associated with 
a member; (5) suspend or bar a member or person associated with a member from 
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and has diligently exercised this power to patrol its members and safeguard 
investors.255  Third, “FINRA is not alone” in its policing duties, as the SEC 
has “broad powers to remedy wrongdoing” as well,256 and has similarly been 
willing to flex its enforcement authority.257  Fourth and finally, in instances 
of fraud, prosecutors can pursue criminal actions against the fraudulent 
companies and individuals.258  Hence, with multiple layers of oversight and 
regulation in the securities industry, class actions are not essential for 
investor protection and end up hurting investors more than helping them.259 
In addition to class actions not being necessary to help police broker-
 
association with all members; (6) impose a temporary or permanent cease and desist 
order against a member or a person associated with a member; or (7) impose any other 
fitting sanction. 
FINRA R. 8310(a) (emphases added).  This substantial authority, along with FINRA’s sweeping 
oversight, provides substantial protection for investors, making class actions in court as further 
protection unnecessary.  See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 255. See News Release, FINRA, 2012: FINRA Year in Review (Jan. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2013/P197624; see also supra note 49 and 
accompanying text.  In 2012 alone, FINRA did “1,846 routine examinations, more than 800 branch 
office examinations, and 5,100 cause examinations” after receiving customer complaints, 
terminations for cause, and regulatory tips about misbehaving broker-dealers.  News Release, 
FINRA, supra.  These investigations led FINRA to expel “30 firms from the securities industry,” as 
well as “bar[] 294 individuals and suspend[] 549 brokers from association with FINRA-regulated 
firms.”  Id.  In addition, FINRA ordered broker-dealers to pay over $100 million in fines and 
restitution to harmed investors.  Id. 
 256. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 19.  The SEC has authority to “bring 
an action in a United States district court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose, 
upon a proper showing, a civil penalty to be paid by the person who committed [a] violation” of any 
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, any of the Act’s rules and regulations, or any 
cease-and-desist orders entered by the Commission.  15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A) (2012).  The SEC is 
also authorized to specifically protect and remedy wrongs against investors, by granting “any 
equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”  § 78u(d)(5).     
 257. In addition to all the efforts taken by FINRA in 2012, the SEC independently brought “734 
enforcement actions,” one shy of the SEC’s record set the previous year, and obtained orders 
“requiring the payment of more than $3 billion in penalties and disgorgement for the benefit of 
harmed investors.”  Press Release, U.S. SEC, SEC’s Enforcement Program Continues to Show 
Strong Results in Safeguarding Investors and Markets (Nov. 14, 2012), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171485830#.UuQ8hWTTky4.  Specifically, the 
SEC brought 134 enforcement actions against broker-dealers, which was a 19% increase from the 
prior year.  Id.  The SEC itself is quite satisfied with its recent work, evidenced by the SEC’s 
Division of Enforcement Director, Robert Khumazi, stating that “[i]t’s not simply numbers, but the 
increasing complexity and diversity of the cases we file that shows how successful we’ve been.”  Id. 
 258. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 19. 
 259. See supra notes 253−58 and accompanying text. 
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dealers, class actions only end up taking more money from investors in the 
long run than arbitrating individually in FINRA arbitrations.260  Because 
class actions require broker-dealers to pay far more legal expenses and 
attorney’s fees to defend than individual FINRA arbitrations,261 broker-
dealers’ overall costs rise.262  Basic economics correctly predict that these 
increased costs will be passed along to investors in the form of higher fees 
and larger commissions.263  Conversely, if agreements to arbitrate disputes 
on an individual basis, like Schwab’s, are properly enforced, “market 
competition w[ill] lead to the cost savings [experienced by broker-dealers] 
being passed along to their customers.”264  Thus, the enforcement of class 
action waivers results in joint savings for each side, benefitting both broker-
dealers and investors.265 
Therefore, taking a broader view of the effects of class actions on 
investors in the securities industry reveals that the fears expressed by so 
many critics of Schwab’s proposed class action waiver are shortsighted.266  
 
 260. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 19−20.   
 261. In fact, one recent study of in-house attorneys and general counsel found that securities class 
actions, due to their complexity, are the most expensive, based on money spent on legal fees, type of 
class action.  CARLTON FIELDS, THE 2013 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY 12 (2013), 
available at http://www.cfjblaw.com/files/uploads/Carlton-Fields-Class-Action-Report-2013-
electronic.pdf.  The source of these process costs are from “the time and legal fees[,] spent on 
pleadings, discovery, motions, trial or hearing, and appeal,” associated with class actions that are 
greatly reduced in arbitration forums like FINRA’s.  Ware, supra note 224, at 258.    
 262. Ware, supra note 224, at 254; see Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 20.  
It is hard to dispute the argument that enforcing arbitration agreements saves broker-dealers money 
via lower dispute resolution costs, because, if it did not, “why would they continue to use them?”  
Ware, supra note 224, at 254.   
 263. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 20; see Ware, supra note 224, at 
254−57. 
 264. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 149, at 20; see Ware, supra note 224, at 255 
(“[W]hatever lowers costs to businesses tends over time to lower prices to consumers.”).  Although 
critics may debate the actual size of the price reduction for broker-dealer customers as a result of 
enforcing class action waivers, “it is inconsistent with basic economics to question the existence of 
the price reduction.”  Ware, supra note 224, at 256.  Additionally, the argument that investors fare 
better at gaining recompense in arbitration than class actions, see supra Part IV.B, is not foreclosed 
by the fact that class action waivers save broker-dealers money because “the business defendant’s 
process costs in arbitration are so much lower in arbitration [than class actions] that, for the business, 
the process-cost savings outweighs the increase in payments for awards and settlements” with 
investors.  Ware, supra note 224, at 259. 
 265. See supra notes 260−64 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra Part IV.A−C. 
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Thorough analysis shows that, when compared with securities class actions, 
FINRA arbitrations provide investors with quicker and cheaper resolutions 
of disputes with broker-dealers,267 higher rates of recovery as well as larger 
recoveries,268 and overall greater savings through broker-dealers not having 
to pass the increased costs of defending class actions on to investors.269  
Additionally, class actions are not truly necessary to protect investors from 
broker-dealer misconduct because there are multiple sources helping police 
the securities industry.270  In sum, all of these findings lead to one 
conclusion: enforcing arbitration agreements and class action waivers would 
benefit investors rather than hurt them.271 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because Schwab declined to appeal FINRA’s Board of Governors’ 
decision, which prevented a federal circuit court or the Supreme Court from 
hearing the issue, the question of whether SEC-approved FINRA Rules 
override the FAA’s mandate will have to wait to be conclusively answered.  
However, the Supreme Court’s most recent precedent interpreting the FAA 
is strikingly clear: arbitration agreements must be enforced according to 
their terms.272  This policy of enforcing the FAA has persisted despite 
arguments that enforcing agreements to arbitrate robs individuals of the 
opportunity to vindicate their rights.273  Enforcement of the FAA absent 
finding a contrary congressional command has been applied in numerous 
contexts similar to the securities industry and has permitted the FAA to 
override federal agencies’ self-interested interpretations of federal statutes.274  
Hence, FINRA’s Hearing Panel was actually correct in holding that Schwab 
could enforce its class action waiver despite FINRA Rules prohibiting it.275 
Not only is this the conclusion that the law mandates, but it would have 
 
 267. See supra Part IV.A. 
 268. See supra Part IV.B. 
 269. See supra Part IV.C. 
 270. See supra Part IV.C. 
 271. See supra Part IV. 
 272. See supra Part II.B.2−4. 
 273. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 274. See supra Part III.B−C. 
 275. See supra Part III.A. 
[Vol. 42: 109, 2014] The Great and Powerful FAA 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
153 
also been the best result for investors because investors fare better in faster 
and cheaper FINRA arbitrations than in judicial class actions.276  
Additionally, preventing class actions benefits both broker-dealers and 
investors.277  This is because broker-dealers’ cost savings from arbitration 
are passed along to investors thanks to vigorous competition in the broker-
dealer industry.278  Moreover, the arguments made by opponents of 
Schwab’s proposed class action waiver (i.e., that investors must be able to 
participate in class actions in order to help police broker-dealers and keep 
investors safe), are refuted by a deeper investigation into the facts.279  Thus, 
instead of being fearful of the potential future adoption of class action 
waivers in customer agreements by other broker-dealers following Schwab’s 
attempt,280 these supposed protectors of investors should begin encouraging 
class action waivers, if they truly do have investors’ best interests at heart. 
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